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ABSTRACT
The increase of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) at-
tacks in volume, frequency, and complexity, combined with
the constant required alertness for mitigating web applica-
tion threats, has caused many website owners to turn to
Cloud-based Security Providers (CBSPs) to protect their in-
frastructure. These solutions typically involve the rerouting
of tra c from the original website through the CBSP’s net-
work, where malicious tra c can be detected and absorbed
before it ever reaches the servers of the protected website.
The most popular Cloud-based Security Providers do not re-
quire the purchase of dedicated tra c-rerouting hardware,
but rely solely on changing the DNS settings of a domain
name to reroute a website’s tra c through their security in-
frastructure. Consequently, this rerouting mechanism can
be completely circumvented by directly attacking the web-
site’s hosting IP address. Therefore, it is crucial for the
security and availability of these websites that their real IP
address remains hidden from potential attackers.
In this paper, we discuss existing, as well as novel “origin-
exposing”attack vectors which attackers can leverage to dis-
cover the IP address of the server where a website protected
by a CBSP is hosted. To assess the impact of the discussed
origin-exposing vectors on the security of CBSP-protected
websites, we consolidate all vectors into Cloudpiercer, an
automated origin-exposing tool, which we then use to con-
duct the first large-scale analysis of the e↵ectiveness of the
origin-exposing vectors. Our results show that the problem
is severe: 71.5% of the 17,877 CBSP-protected websites that
we tested, expose their real IP address through at least one
of the evaluated vectors. The results of our study categori-
cally demonstrate that a comprehensive adoption of CBSPs
is harder than just changing DNS records. Our findings
can steer CBSPs and site administrators towards e↵ective
countermeasures, such as proactively scanning for origin ex-
posure and using appropriate network configurations that
can greatly reduce the threat.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks
have threatened the availability of online services for years,
attacks are rapidly increasing in volume, complexity and
frequency. Early 2014, the Network Time Protocol (NTP)
was exploited in order to conduct amplification attacks [45]
of previously unseen magnitudes, leading to multiple record-
breaking volumetric attacks that reached up to 500 Gbps [35,
52]. Unfortunately, these powerful attacks are no longer ex-
ceptional cases. For instance, in 2014, there were four times
as many attacks that crossed the 100 Gbps barrier as com-
pared to 2013 [4]. Consequently, these massive attacks are
now regarded as “the new normal” [23], an observation fur-
ther confirmed by the frequent news reports of high-profile
websites and web applications that become victims of such
attacks [15].
Aside from advancing in strength and complexity, DDoS
attacks are becoming increasingly accessible to the general
public. The main cause is the rising popularity of web-
sites o↵ering DDoS attacks as a service, which enable non-
technical users to launch DDoS attacks with the click of a
button. These services, often called booters or stressers, al-
low their customers to orchestrate powerful DDoS attacks
for just a few dollars through convenient, and user-friendly
web interfaces [20].
To cope with the elevated risk and increased di culty
in fending o↵ large DDoS attacks, several companies engi-
neered highly capable, globally distributed networks that
are able to deal with with DDoS tra c and malicious web
requests. The resulting cloud-based defense infrastructure
is then shared among the companies’ customers. It is safe
to assume that not all customers will be su↵ering from a
large DDoS attack simultaneously, and thus companies can
dedicate enough bandwidth and processing power to clients
that are, at any given point, under attack.
Since several of these Cloud-based Security Providers (CB-
SPs) solely rely on changing the DNS settings of a domain
name to reroute a website’s tra c through their security in-
frastructure, the rerouting mechanism can be, in principle,
completely circumvented by directly attacking the website’s
hosting IP address. Therefore, it is crucial for the security
and availability of these websites that their real IP address,
referred to as the origin, remains hidden from potential at-
tackers. Past reports have claimed that the origin of CBSP
customers can potentially be acquired through various meth-
ods, such as querying historical DNS data for a domain, and
searching for subdomains that directly resolve to a server’s
real IP address [34]. Although these origin-exposing attack
vectors have been known since 2013, the global extent of this
issue has not yet been evaluated.
In this paper, we assess the magnitude of this problem on
a large scale, i.e., we evaluate the number of protected do-
mains whose CBSP-based protection can be bypassed. First,
we discuss eight existing as well as novel vectors that have
the potential to expose the underlying IP address of a CBSP-
protected web server. Next, we consolidate these vectors
intoCloudpiercer, an automated origin-exposing tool. We
deploy Cloudpiercer and conduct the first large-scale ex-
periment where we evaluate 17,877 domains that are pro-
tected by five di↵erent CBSPs. Cloudpiercer uses a novel
verification method to ensure that an IP address retrieved by
the vectors is indeed the real origin of a website. After this
verification step, we find that over 70% of protected domains
expose their real IP address and, as a consequence, can be
attacked directly, rendering the cloud-based protection ser-
vice useless. Furthermore, we elaborate on the impact and
prevalence of each exposing vector and discuss the feasibility
of remediating the problem.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• We provide a comprehensive overview of novel and pre-
viously known origin-exposing vectors that allow at-
tackers to bypass CBSPs.
• We report on the first large-scale measurement of this
crucial security issue and conclude that the majority
of CBSP clients are at risk, while providing insights
into which vectors are most widespread.
• We discuss the di culties of mitigating origin expo-
sure, while suggesting several e↵ective countermeasures
that can vastly remediate the problem.
2. BACKGROUND
As Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are be-
coming increasingly powerful, it becomes infeasible for web-
sites to protect their own infrastructure. Even advanced, on-
site, defense systems are rendered useless when the amount
of tra c exceeds the processing capabilities of upstream de-
vices or simply saturates the entire network connection. Fur-
thermore, with the constant evolution of web application
threats, there is also a need for increasing resources to fend
o↵ breaches. As a result, website owners turn to Cloud-
based Security Providers (CBSPs) to protect their infras-
tructure. These companies reroute tra c from the original
website through their network where malicious tra c is fil-
tered before it ever reaches the network of their customer.
2.1 Modus Operandi of CBSPs
CBSPs act as reverse proxies for the web servers they are
protecting. They inspect incoming tra c for various clients
simultaneously, by routing it through their own distributed
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Figure 1: An unprotected server receives malicious tra c,
potentially breaching the web server or denying service to
the legitimate tra c (upper). Malicious tra c heading to-
wards the protected server is absorbed by the CBSP, only
allowing legitimate tra c to pass through (lower).
infrastructure. These cloud-based infrastructures, often re-
ferred to as scrubbing centers, act as highly-available tra c
filters that are capable of absorbing extremely large volu-
metric DDoS attacks. Furthermore, they often integrate
Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to filter out malicious
web application tra c, such as application-layer DDoS at-
tempts, SQL injections and XSS attacks.
As depicted in Figure 1, all tra c towards a CBSP-protected
web server, often referred to as the origin, is redirected
through cloud-based scrubbing centers. After inspection of
the incoming requests, only “clean tra c” is forwarded to
the web server, e↵ectively stopping attacks before they even
reach the customer’s premises.
Rerouting mechanisms
Several di↵erent strategies exist to route a web server’s traf-
fic through the cloud-based infrastructure. For instance, a
website administrator can either opt for an always-on or
for an on-demand strategy. The former redirects all tra c
through the scrubbing centers on a permanent basis. The
latter only starts redirecting tra c when necessary. Usually,
this requires customer-premises equipment (CPE), that lo-
cally monitors incoming tra c. In case an attack is detected,
this device initiates the redirection mechanism.
When tra c-redirection is active, there are two mecha-
nisms to reroute tra c through the scrubbing centers. The
first option isDNS rerouting, where an administrator changes
the DNS settings of his website’s domain name so that it re-
solves to an IP address that belongs to the CBSP. Normally,
when a visitor requests a webpage, e.g., from example.com,
his computer will first make a request to a DNS server to
discover the corresponding IP address. Next, the visitor’s
browser can request the page from example.com’s web server
using the discovered IP address. In the case of CBSPs,
the visitors of the protected domain will receive an IP ad-
dress of the CBSP’s scrubbing center from the DNS server.
Hence, the visitor will direct his requests to the scrubbing
center, which in turn will transparently forward the legit-
imate requests to the origin, i.e., the actual web server of
example.com.
Alternatively, a technique called BGP rerouting can be
adopted. When the entity managing the website controls
an entire /24 IP block, it can withdraw the BGP announce-
ments for that block from its own routers. At this point, the
CBSP can initiate BGP announcements for that IP range
from their own network. Consequently, all tra c destined
for the web server’s IP address will start flowing through
the CBSP’s scrubbing centers. Since BGP rerouting is only
available to entities that manage entire IP blocks and are
able to install dedicated hardware, DNS rerouting has be-
come the cloud-based security alternative for the masses [7].
2.2 CDNs as CBSPs
At their core, Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) are
globally deployed services that increase the performance of
websites by bringing static web content closer to users. The
network usually consists out of a large set of geographically-
distributed cache servers. This allows a CDN to quickly
serve cached content from a server that is near a particular
user. This setup reduces response times, load, and band-
width of a website’s main web server.
Similar to CBSPs, a CDN intercepts requests to a web
server, which enables it to inspect incoming requests and se-
lectively decide whether to serve cached content or forward
the request to the web server for a dynamically generated
response. Therefore, tra c towards the web server has to
be constantly redirected through the CDN. To achieve this,
CDNs either opt for URL rewriting or DNS rerouting [28].
Considering that a CDN’s infrastructure is inherently ca-
pable of inspecting requests to leverage intelligent caching
techniques, they are ideally placed to provide cloud-based
security as well. Since tra c is already being redirected
through their CDN, scrubbing centers and WAFs can be
conveniently chained in the infrastructure. Moreover, in
terms of volumetric DDoS attacks, a CDN is an ideal fit for
mitigation strategies due to their geographically distributed
and highly-available network. By using Anycast [1], servers
spread across the globe can each process a small portion of
the distributed attack, e↵ectively making it feasible to ab-
sorb large amounts of malicious tra c.
As a result from this overlapping feature set, a signifi-
cant share of CBSPs has emerged from CDN providers that
started o↵ering security services on top of their existing
platform. Similarly, several security-focused companies that
provided cloud-based services, have also started incorporat-
ing caching features to their infrastructure. Consequently,
the line between CDNs and CBSPs is blurred. As such,
the origin-exposing vectors that we discuss in Section 3 are
applicable to CBSPs as well as to CDNs with security ex-
tensions.
3. POTENTIAL ORIGIN EXPOSURE
While CBSPs have become really popular because of their
ability to stop real, large DDoS [38] and web application at-
tacks, there are concerns about their DNS rerouting mecha-
nisms. The concept of cloud-based security relies on keeping
the underlying web server, the so-called origin, secret and
inaccessible by direct tra c. However, in the case of DNS
rerouting, this is achieved by hiding the origin’s IP address
and relying on redirection through the use of the website’s
domain name. Consequently, as illustrated in Figure 2, the
website is only protected against tra c that uses the domain
name to initiate the connection. So, in principle, if attackers
are able to discover the real IP address of the origin, they can
target tra c to the web server directly, thereby circumvent-
ing all security mechanisms present in the CBSP’s network.
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Figure 2: In the case of DNS rerouting, only tra c that uses
the domain name is diverted through the CBSP’s network.
Tra c that uses the IP address of the protected server can
reach the web server directly.
We refer to this security concern as the risk of origin ex-
posure. This issue, which is specific to DNS rerouting, has
been raised several times before [31, 34], and has, in the
past, received some attention by the press, followed by sev-
eral reactions from the security companies [27,48,53]. Many
di↵erent potential vulnerabilities exist that might expose a
CBSP-protected website’s origin. We refer to these potential
vulnerabilities as origin-exposing vectors. In the remainder
of this section, we discuss eight origin-exposing vectors, of
wich four have been reported previously, as well as four novel
vectors, namely Temporary DNS exposure, SSL Certificates
and specific instances of Sensitive Files and Outbound Con-
nection Triggering. All vectors combined later form the basis
of our automated scanning tool, Cloudpiercer.
3.1 IP History
When setting up cloud-based security, website adminis-
trators are required to change the DNS settings for their
domain. From that point on, the origin’s IP address is no
longer listed in the DNS records of the domain name. As
already mentioned in earlier sections, this secrecy is crucial
for preventing origin exposure. However, if the origin is still
assigned the same IP address as before the adoption of a
CBSP, the server can be exposed through historical knowl-
edge of the domain and its corresponding IP address.
Several companies specialize in harvesting data about do-
main names by continually tracking their DNS configura-
tion. This allows them to build a vast database of historical
DNS records, mainly used for domain marketing research,
which can also be leveraged to track down an origin’s IP
address.
Accessing these databases is almost e↵ortless and some of
these services even o↵er a small number of free queries. How-
ever, these databases do not cover all existing domains as
some TLDs do not share their zone files, making it harder to
discover and monitor some domains. At the same time, do-
mains that are not indexed in these databases are certainly
not guaranteed to be safe from IP history vulnerabilities.
For instance, if an attacker has been targeting a particular
victim for a prolonged period, he could have manually gath-
ered information about the domain and its origin before it
was protected by the CBSP.
Because of the multitude of parties that could be collecting
historical information about websites and their IP addresses,
several CBSPs recommend administrators to assign a new
IP address to their web server after migrating their DNS
records to the CBSP [48].
3.2 Subdomains
Since the CBSP acts as a reverse proxy for multiple clients
simultaneously, it relies on information available in HTTP
requests to distinguish between requests intended for di↵er-
ent clients. More specifically, by looking at the domain listed
in the HTTP Host header, the CBSP can correctly forward
incoming tra c to the intended origin. An unfortunate side-
e↵ects is that protocols that do not contain host information,
such as FTP and SSH, cannot be properly handled by the
CBSPs’ proxies and are thus, by default, broken.
There are two ways around this problem: first, instead
of using the domain name, an administrator can directly
specify the origin’s IP address when working with non-web
protocols. This, however, lacks the flexibility of a domain-
name-based solution since the IP address must be either
hardcoded in scripts and program profiles, or remembered
by a website’s administrator.
Alternatively, administrators can create a specific subdo-
main, such as origin.example.com, that directly resolves to
the origin’s IP address. This provides a convenient tool for
non-web protocols to bypass the CBSP and establish a direct
connection with the origin. However, since this workaround
e↵ectively creates a direct path to a website’s origin, it is
a potential backdoor that, if discovered, can be abused by
attackers. In the absence of misconfigured DNS servers al-
lowing unauthenticated Zone Transfers, subdomains are not
directly visible when querying the DNS records of the main
domain name. An attacker can, however, perform a dic-
tionary attack by trying to guess valid subdomains, using
dictionaries of words popularly used in subdomains.
3.3 DNS records
Once a website is protected, the DNS A record of its do-
main name points to an IP address of the CBSP instead of
directly to the origin. However, it is possible that traces of
the origin are still present in other DNS records.
For instance, MX records reference the mail servers that are
responsible for accepting email messages that are destined
for mailboxes on a given domain. When only HTTP tra c is
forwarded by the CBSP, SMTP needs to be able to establish
a direct connection with the mail server. Therefore, the MX
records should directly resolve to the mail server’s IP address
in order to keep email services operational. This can lead to
origin exposure, especially when the mail server is listening
on the same network interface as the origin’s web server.
Another potentially problematic case are TXT records, of-
ten used for mechanisms such as the Sender Policy Frame-
work (SPF) [21]. This framework aims to counter email
address spoofing by validating the IP address of the sender
against a list of approved IP addresses. The list of addresses
from which emails may be sent, has to be placed in an TXT
record of the domain [30]. Thus, if one wants the origin
server to be able to send out emails using the SPF mecha-
nism, they are forced to expose its IP address in the appro-
priate TXT record. Note that the solution to this problem is
not obvious; an administrator has to choose to either aban-
don the Sender Policy Framework (thereby opening himself
to email abuse), or accept that the protected web server
cannot send verified emails.
The origin exposure, unfortunately, is not limited to TXT
and MX records. Especially when a CBSP does not manage
the DNS records of its customers’ domains, exposure from
other records may be overlooked by the customer. For in-
stance, if the origin is accessible through IPv6, AAAA records
are present. If the CBSP’s setup instructions only cover
the change of the A record of the domain, the AAAA record
might be left unchanged, e↵ectively keeping the origin ex-
posed through its IPv6 address.
3.4 Temporary exposure
Administrators might temporarily pause the cloud-based
security service, e.g., for maintenance or server migrations.
During this time, the domain might temporarily resolve to
its origin, e↵ectively leading to a brief origin exposure. Tem-
porary leaks can occur in many DNS record types, including
MX, CNAMEs, and TXT. Attackers who are closely monitoring
their victim might be able to witness a temporary exposure.
Once the origin is known, the web server remains vulnera-
ble even after the leak has disappeared, since the attacker
can keep reusing the leaked IP address. The leak will only
be remediated when the administrator decides to, yet again,
change the IP address associated with the victim website.
3.5 SSL certificates
If administrators want to enable HTTPS for their web-
site while under the protection of a CBSP, they can let the
CBSP set up a certificate for their domain. This enables
the CBSP to take care of securing the front-end connection
between their own cloud infrastructure and a visitor. Alter-
natively, the administrator can hand over the private key of
their origin’s certificate to the CBSP. In this case, the CBSP
can set up the front-end SSL connection with the website’s
own certificate. In order to secure the back-end connection
between the CBSP and the origin, the origin must present a
certificate. However, this certificate lists the domain name
as the subject, and therefore identifies itself as the origin.
In other words, if an attacker is able to scan all IP addresses
and retrieve all SSL certificates, he can find the IP addresses
of hosts with certificates that are associated with the domain
he is trying to expose. Because of recent advancements in
network scanners, performing such a massive scan has be-
come quite feasible. For example, using ZMAP [14] and an
appropriately fast network connection, allows an attacker to
conduct a scan of the entire IPv4 address space on a single
port in 45 minutes.
3.6 Sensitive files
Sensitive files located on the server form another vector
through which a server’s IP address can be exposed. For
instance, files that were created during the development or
configuration phase, in order to aid the administrator, can
be used to expose a server’s origin, especially when they
show detailed information regarding the server. Further-
more, as already explained by Akamai [27], verbose error
pages and log files can also disclose the origin that is meant
to be kept secret. Usually, these types of files are meant to
be removed or given proper access restrictions once a web-
site goes into production, but presumably this is not always
done correctly.
3.7 Origin in content
Instead of using a domain name to link to content, a web-
page is free to use the IP address of the server directly. For
example, a developer might use the IP address directly in
the HTML of a page during an early development phase of
the website. Although this is probably rather uncommon,
it does form a potential origin-exposing vector. Further-
more, the IP address might be listed in the HTML as part
of server-side software calculating web server statistics.
3.8 Outbound connections
Although a web server’s incoming connections are rerouted
through the CBSP’s infrastructure, this is not the case for
outbound connections. When a web server initiates an out-
going connection on its own accord, the CBSP is not used
as a proxy. Consequently, the origin establishes a direct
connection with an external host, e↵ectively exposing its IP
address to that particular host.
In order to exploit this phenomenon, an attacker can at-
tempt to deliberately trigger the origin to initiate outgo-
ing connections. Many possibilities exist in this regard and
these are usually very specific to the applications running
on the web server. Some examples include the possibility
to upload a file via a URL, or link back mechanisms such
as PingBack [25], which retrieve external webpages to verify
whether a claimed link to their website is real or not.
4. LARGE-SCALE ANALYSIS
To assess the magnitude of the origin-exposure problem,
we conduct a large-scale analysis in which we attempt to
uncover the origin of CBSP-protected domains. First, we
consolidate the eight origin-exposing vectors into one auto-
mated origin-exposing system called Cloudpiercer. Then,
we assemble a list of clients from five CBSP companies by
studying their DNS configurations and obtaining their adop-
tion rate across the Alexa top 1 million websites. Starting
from these client lists, we use Cloudpiercer to evaluate
17,877 long-term, CBSP-protected domains against origin
exposure. In the final step of Cloudpiercer, all collected
candidate IP addresses are validated with a novel verification
method to assess whether each discovered IP address is in-
deed the one of a protected website. Using Cloudpiercer,
we are not only able to measure the amount of bypassable
domains but also to gauge which origin-exposing vectors are
the most prevalent.
4.1 CBSP Providers
For our purposes, we are interested in analyzing various
always-on, DNS rerouting CBSPs. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2, several CBSPs are CDNs that o↵er additional se-
curity services, and vice versa. Since it is not straightfor-
ward to externally distinguish between clients that only use
the CDN capabilities from those who are specifically paying
for a plan that includes security, we selected five well-known
providers that have a specific focus on security, i.e., at least
some form of cloud-based security is present by default in all
of these provider’s pricing plans. The selected providers are
CloudFlare, Incapsula, DOSarrest, Prolexic (PLXedge) and
Sucuri (Cloud Proxy). We gather a list of clients from each
provider, enabling us to study their necessary configurations
and their adoption by popular websites.
Security Provider DNS Configuration Domains
CloudFlare NS 35,552
Incapsula A, CNAME 1,841
DOSarrest A 1,295
Prolexic A 829
Sucuri Cloud Proxy A 281
Table 1: Cloud-based security providers, along with the DNS
records that are adjusted by their clients, and the number
of protected domains that were found in the Alexa top 1
million.
Clients
In order to identify protected clients, we need to be aware of
the di↵erent DNS configurations that are required by each of
the CBSPs. To retrieve this information, we first attempted
to subscribe to each company, and took note of the set up
process. If we were not able to register, e.g., due to the ab-
sence of trial or free service tiers, we searched for publicly
available instructions or retrieved representative configura-
tion settings by manually finding other existing clients.
Generally, we found two di↵erent types of DNS configu-
rations that are used to reroute a website’s tra c: chang-
ing the NS records and changing the A records. Incapsula,
DOSarrest, Sucuri and Prolexic instruct their clients to change
their domain’s A record to a specific IP address, that is under
the CBSP’s control. In some cases, the CNAME or A record of
the www subdomain is configured as well.
When the NS records of the domain have to be changed, as
it is the case with CloudFlare, the entire DNS records of the
domain name become actively managed by the CBSP’s name
servers. Consequently, all DNS records of the domain and its
subdomains fall under their direct authority. This enables
the CBSP to provide all the necessary DNS records in order
for rerouting to take place. However, the configuration of
additional custom records, such as the MX records to identify
the domain’s mail server, has to be managed through the
CBSP’s own custom interface where these additional records
need to be added by the client.
Adoption
To assess the adoption of CBSPs, we analyze the top 1 mil-
lion most popular websites, according to Alexa [3]. By re-
trieving each domain’s DNS records and comparing them
with the collected CBSP configurations, we can straightfor-
wardly compile a list of the most popular CBSP-protected
domains. Table 1 lists the number of clients found for each
company, along with the type of DNS configuration that was
used for identification.
When we evaluate the adoption of cloud-based security,
we find that 4% of the web’s most popular 1 million web-
sites are protected by one of the five companies under anal-
ysis. Moreover, cloud-based security services appear to be
a more prominent solution amongst the more popular web-
sites, since, if we restrict our search to the top 10K websites,
the CBSP adoption increases to 9%. To further quantify
the relationship between CBSP adoption and website pop-
ularity, Figure 3 shows the distribution of each company’s
client list across rankings. Four out of five companies have a
significantly higher portion of domains in the top 100K seg-
ment, further strengthening the correlation between CBSP
adoption and website popularity. More specifically, Cloud-
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Figure 3: The portion of domains protected by each company, across segments of the Alexa top 1 million. For example, about
15% of the domains protected by Incapsula are situated between rank 100,000 and 200,000.
Flare, Incapsula and Sucuri have visibly less clients com-
ing from the lower parts of the Alexa ranking. DOSarrest
and Prolexic do not show this kind of correlation. However,
we found that both companies have large domain parking
services as one of their customers. These parking services
are responsible for a large number of relatively unpopular
undeveloped domains that are placed under protection by
the CBSP thereby a↵ecting the ranking distribution of the
clients of these CBSPs.
Evaluated domains
For our large-scale analysis, we subjected the entire list of
clients in the Alexa top 1 million of Incapsula, DOSarrest,
Prolexic and Sucuri, as input to Cloudpiercer. Because
of the disproportional popularity of CloudFlare, we decided
to test a random sample of only half of their clients. This
sample is small enough to allow us to conduct our experi-
ments in a reasonable amount of time and large enough so
that any conclusions can be safely generalized to the pop-
ulation of CloudFlare’s clients. In addition, we limited the
experiment to domains that remained customers of a CBSP
during, at least, our 6-month monitoring period. Through
this filtering process, we aim to remove negative bias, by ex-
cluding customers that were simply trying-out a CBSP and
were, perhaps, not interested enough to take all necessary
precautionary steps and eliminate origin-exposure vectors.
Overall, this process resulted in a final list of 17,877 do-
mains, which we refer to as the evaluation set.
4.2 Origin Verification
To determine whether a discovered IP address is the actual
origin of a CBSP-protected website, we evaluate whether we
can retrieve the website’s landing page using that IP ad-
dress. First, we ensure that the IP address is a valid candi-
date by verifying that it does not belong to an address block
owned by a CBSP. Then, our verification starts by visiting
the website through its CBSP-protected domain name to
retrieve the URL of the landing page. For example, when
issuing a regular HTTP request to http://example.com, the
browser might be redirected to a landing page with a dif-
ferent scheme, host and path, such as https://blog.example.
com/about me.html. Next, we use PhantomJS [18], an in-
strumented browser, to initiate an HTTP request to the can-
didate IP address, incorporating the previously extracted
scheme, host and path of the landing page. If the candidate
IP address is the actual origin of the website, this HTTP re-
quest should return the same webpage as the request using
the domain name, as both requests are identical from the
web server’s perspective.
Determining, however, whether two webpages are iden-
tical is not as straightforward as executing a simple string
comparison. For instance, when loaded twice, the same page
can result in di↵erent HTML as dynamically generated con-
tent may be included in the website’s response, such as, ro-
tating articles and advertisements. In addition, timestamps
and random values embedded in a webpage can also alter
the resulting HTML. Moreover, several CBSPs inject con-
tent into the displayed page, such as, analytics scripts, which
will not be present in a direct response from the origin.
To account for this natural variability, we designed a more
intelligent and robust HTML comparison technique. Instead
of comparing strings, we examine the structure of the DOM
(Document Object Model). We parse both HTML strings
with LXML and BeautifulSoup [43] into a tree represen-
tation of the nodes in the DOM. Next, we determine the
di↵erence between the two trees by calculating the Zhang-
Shasha’s tree edit distance [55], which counts the number
of edit operations (insertions, deletions and substitutions of
nodes) to get from one tree to the other. Furthermore, we
extended the implementation [17] by incorporating normal-
ization which is necessary to meaningfully compare the mea-
sured distances between tree-pairs of di↵erent sizes. Normal-
ization is achieved by dividing the calculated edit distance
by the sum of the tree sizes. We refer to this metric as the
Normalized DOM-edit Distance (NDD).
Prior to our large-scale analysis, we measured the inter-
page and intra-page NDD distributions from a random set
of domains from the Alexa top 1 million, enabling us to cal-
culate an optimal threshold. Additionally, we evaluated the
e↵ect of a more coarse-grained tree comparison by pruning
the DOM trees to a certain maximum nesting depth. We
measured the NDD between 3,500 pairs of di↵erent web-
site’s landing pages, as well as between 3,500 pairs of the
same landing page loaded twice. Furthermore, we conducted
this test for di↵erent tree pruning levels. Afterwards, we
used this data to choose an optimal threshold that is used
to decide whether two di↵erent HTML documents are, in
fact, the same webpage. When evaluating thresholds, we
focussed primarily on limiting false positives (two di↵erent
webpages that are falsely marked as identical). At the end
of this process, we found that a threshold of 0.18, at a maxi-
mum nesting depth of 5 levels, results in zero false positives
and only 0.36% false negatives.
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Figure 4: For each 100K-rank segment in the Alexa top
1 million, the percentage of domains where the CBSP is
bypassable.
4.3 Ethical Considerations
To realistically assess the magnitude of the origin-exposing
problem in the wild, one cannot avoid scanning real on-
line websites and web applications. During our analysis and
the development of Cloudpiercer, we took all appropriate
steps to ensure that neither the origins, nor the CBSPs, were
negatively impacted by our measurements. In addition, we
only used publicly available webpages and data from pub-
licly available sources.
Since the evaluated domain names are a subset of the
most visited websites in the world, their infrastructure is
capable of processing an abundant amount of requests on a
daily basis. Nevertheless, we took several steps to minimize
the impact of our analysis. For instance, the number of con-
tacted PingBack endpoints was limited to three per domain,
although, often, many more were present. Furthermore, web
requests and DNS queries were adequately spaced in time in
order to minimize impact on servers. Overall, we believe
that the e↵ects of our experiment on each individual site
were minimal and we are confident that for the majority of
websites, the extra tra c generated by our requests was just
part of the expected tra c variability.
4.4 Results
All 17,877 domains in the evaluation set were subjected,
by Cloudpiercer, to each of the eight origin-exposing vec-
tors. Afterwards, Cloudpiercer used the origin verifica-
tion algorithm to determine which IP addresses were the ac-
tual websites’ hosting IP addresses. These results allow us
to measure, both the origin-exposing power of each attack
vector, as well as the overall risk of the origin being exposed.
We manually inspected a sample of 250 exposed origins and
saw that there were no false-positive verifications.
Overall, we found that 71.5% of protected domains is by-
passable by combining the e↵ect of all origin-exposing vec-
tors. Table 2 lists the success-rate of each individual vec-
tor for the client domains of the di↵erent CBSPs. Subdo-
mains and IP history are clearly the major vulnerabilities,
both compromising the origin of more than 40% of domains.
Figure 4 sheds light on the di↵erences in the bypass-ratio
between highly-ranked and less popular domains. We ob-
serve that for four out of five companies, domains in the
top 100K are less susceptible to being exposed. A possible
explanation is that higher ranked websites are more secu-
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Figure 5: The percentage of domains that is susceptible to
one or more origin-exposing vectors.
rity conscious and more concerned with preventing origin
exposure. A similar phenomenon was also observed in [51],
where the top 100K-ranked websites were found to adopt
significantly more web security mechanisms. Conversely, the
risk of being exposed through SSL certificates is up to 3.6
times higher in that same top segment, presumably due to a
higher SSL adoption-rate amongst these security conscious
websites. Except for that first segment, there are no clear
global trends across the remaining lower ranks.
As shown in Figure 5, 42% of domains are susceptible to
exposure by more than one origin-exposing vector. More
specifically, 19% of domains need to patch at least three
origin-exposing vectors before they are safe. These num-
bers indicate that the problem is prevalent as well as multi-
faceted.
In the following paragraphs we discuss the results in more
detail by examining the specifics of each origin-exposing vec-
tor.
Subdomain exposure
Overall, the most prevalent attack vector is the existence of
origin-exposing subdomains. The feasibility of an attacker
finding origin-exposing subdomains was tested by trying a
list 5000 possible subdomains, provided by DNS Recon [36]
on each domain in the evaluation set. If an entry existed for
one or more of the tested subdomains, we verified whether
the IP address to which it resolved was the origin. Our re-
sults indicate that CloudFlare’s and Sucuri’s customers are
particularly vulnerable, with respectively 48.9% and 51.5%
of domains disclosing their real IP address through subdo-
mains.
When we take a closer look at which specific subdomains
are responsible for the exposure, we find that the ftp sub-
domain is the most dominant problem, with 3,952 out of
17,877 domains having this “backdoor.” This result implies
a strong desire by website administrators to be able to use
an FTP client that is able to connect to the server through
a subdomain. Other subdomains that frequently reveal the
origin are often related to email services, such as mail (3,203
domains), webmail (1,662) and smtp (258). Furthermore, a
large number of exposing subdomains is related to cPanel, a
hosting control panel that provides a web interface to help
administrators configure their websites [10]. The discovered,
origin-exposing subdomains are: cpanel (1,456 domains),
webdisk (1,645) and whm (1,359). These subdomains are
Provider CloudFlare Incapsula DOSarrest Prolexic Sucuri All Providers
IP History 37.0% 36.4% 88.8% 40.4% 66.7% 40.5%
Subdomains 48.9% 31.7% 3.3% 7.3% 51.5% 43.4%
DNS records 32.6% 11.2% 0.9% 1.2% 29.0% 27.9%
Temporary DNS 4.1% 0.8% 0.6% 2.0% 0.9% 3.6%
SSL Certificates 9.4% 10.7% 2.5% 6.7% 17.3% 9.1%
Sensitive files 6.4% 1.5% 0.4% 0.2% 8.2% 5.4%
Origin in content 1.2% 0.4% - 0.9% 2.2% 1.0%
PingBack (OC) 8.2% 2.2% 0.3% - 3.9% 6.9%
RefBack (OC) 0.5% 0.1% - 0.3% - 0.5%
All Combined 72.5% 53.8% 92.0% 52.0% 77.9% 71.5%
Table 2: The percentage of domains that can be bypassed using each origin-exposing vector, for each cloud-based security
provider’s customers.
tied to particular services and interfaces incorporated into
cPanel. Although these are HTTP services, they have to be
accessed through non-standard ports which are often inac-
cessible when standard firewall policies are used. Therefore,
cPanel creates these “proxy subdomains” that are directly
linked to a specific port on the origin [9]. Despite the e↵ort
of some CBSPs to support some typical ports used by these
control panels [37], these origin-exposing proxy subdomains
are still frequently used.
The second-most dominating origin-exposing subdomain,
namely direct (3,583 domains), is rather specific to Cloud-
Flare customers. This subdomain was, in the past, given
as an example when a user first configures his domain on
CloudFlare’s web interface [8]. Apparently, a large number
of these clients used the company’s instructions to the let-
ter and thus kept this example subdomain bypass to link
directly to their origin.
Interestingly, DOSarrest and Prolexic customers are less
prone to subdomain exposure, with only 3.3% and 7.3% of
exposed domains respectively. This is most likely due to
the fact that each of their customers receives a dedicated IP
address. This one-to-one mapping between an IP address
of the CBSP and an IP address of the origin enables the
CBSP to simply forward certain ports to the correct origin,
without requiring any additional information to identify the
intended host.
IP history exposure
To assess the number of domains that are still accessible
through a previously documented IP address, we used two
domain tracking services, DomainTools [12] and MyIP.ms [33].
We queried these databases for every domain in our eval-
uation set and all historical IP addresses were marked as
candidates.
After the verification of the collected, “historical” IP ad-
dresses, it is evident that exposure though historical data
is severe. Across all providers, we find that 40.5% of the
domains are vulnerable to being exposed by consulting IP
History databases. Furthermore, the issue is prevalent with
all five provider’s customers. This implies that, in general,
CBSP’s customers often fail to configure a new IP address
after setting up their cloud-based security service. This, in
turn, indicates that customers are either unaware of this at-
tack vector, or are neglecting the CBSP’s recommendation
to change their IP address, possibly because of operational
or infrastructural barriers. Regarding DOSarrest and Pro-
lexic, it should be noted that the misconfiguration of a single
client is greatly influencing the global number of IP history
bypasses. Namely, 92% of DOSarrest’s domains that were
vulnerable to IP history exposure, were caused by domains
that belonged to a single domain parking service. For Pro-
lexic, a similar parking service is responsible for 86% of their
historically exposed subdomains.
DNS record exposure
DNS records are arguably the most trivial and practical at-
tack vector that we studied. To assess whether they reveal
a domain’s origin, we simply retrieved all records for each
domain at a single point in time. From each record we ex-
tracted all IP addresses and marked them as candidates for
the origin. Additionally, if a domain was present in the DNS
record, we resolved the domain and marked the resulting IP
address as a candidate.
Despite its simplicity, we find that a significant number
of domains is exposed by this vector. More specifically, the
origin of CloudFlare-protected domains is exposed by DNS
records in 32.6% of the cases. For Sucuri and Incapsula, this
is 29.0% and 11.2% respectively. Most of these domains are
leaking their IP address through their MX record (4,390 do-
mains), followed by TXT records (1,134), where SPF is often
the reason, as described in Section 3.3. The frequent ex-
posure through these two records suggests that web servers
that send and receive email are responsible for a substantial
fraction of the discovered origin exposure. Interestingly, we
also found 16 domains that were exposed through their A
records. In these cases, both the origin and the CBSP’s IP
address were present in the domain’s A records. We spec-
ulate that in this situation, the client has created an addi-
tional A record for the CBSP’s IP address, while forgetting
to remove the existing record that pointed to the origin. For
the domains under the protection of CloudFlare, the DNS
records are managed by the CBSP. Therefore, we excluded
CloudFlare customers that were exposed through their A
record, as this indicates that the administrator has deliber-
ately paused the CBSP rerouting through CloudFlare’s web
interface.
Temporary exposure
To determine whether origins were temporarily exposed due
to an interruption of the cloud-based security service or due
to a transient leak in another DNS record, we repeatedly
retrieved, on a daily basis, all DNS records of protected do-
mains for a period of 10 weeks (Sucuri and Prolexic) or 16
weeks (CloudFlare, Incapsula and DOSarrest). We excluded
the domains that were already exposed by the one-time DNS
records retrieval, described in the previous paragraph. This
allows us to isolate the domains that only temporarily ex-
posed their origin. The number of temporal exposures is
considerable. We discover that more than 3% of domains
transiently revealed their origin through their DNS records
during a 10 or 16-week period. The vast majority of them
were exposed through their A record, indicating a brief dis-
abling of the protection system.
SSL certificate exposure
In order to find IP addresses hosting SSL certificates associ-
ated with the domains in the evaluation set, we made use of
the publicly available data of Rapid7’s Project Sonar [42].
This project uses ZMAP [14] to periodically conduct scans
of the entire IPv4 address range in search for, among other
things, SSL certificates. We used their certificate data [41]
and extracted all IP addresses that presented certificates re-
lated to the domains in the evaluation set. According to Du-
rumeric et al. [13], 129,695 of the domains in the Alexa top 1
million (13%) possess browser-trusted certificates. This ap-
pears to be in line with the 9% of origins that we discovered
by looking for IP addresses that presented a certificate for
those domains. If the origin desires to secure the back-end
connection (the one between the CBSP and the origin) with
HTTPS, a certificate for its domain has to be presented by
the origin. Paradoxically, this, in turn, makes the entire set
up less secure by introducing the risk of origin exposure.
Sensitive files
We limit our search of sensitive files to the so-called phpinfo
files. These files execute the PHP function phpinfo() [49],
which outputs a large amount of data regarding the server,
the execution environment, PHP compilation options, etc.
This function is particularly interesting because it dynam-
ically retrieves all this data each time it is called. Fur-
thermore, it usually displays the server’s IP address in the
SERVER_ADDR field.
We attempted to find files that execute this function
by trying several obvious file names, namely phpinfo.php,
info.php, test.php and phpMyAdmin/phpinfo.php. Over-
all, we found that 5.4% of domains had at least one of these
files accessible and exposed their origin in this manner. Pre-
sumably, the files are a remainder of the development setup,
which the developers forgot to remove.
Origin in content
For the vectors involving analyzing the HTML content of
pages, we crawled each domain in the evaluation set. First,
we queried Bing for each domain using site:example.com
to retrieve an initial seed of 50 webpages. Starting from this
seed, we crawled additional pages by visiting internal links,
up to a maximum of 500 pages per domain. On average we
retrieved 328 pages per domain in the evaluation set.
To detect whether the origin was present on the website’s
pages, we searched the HTML source code of every crawled
page for the presence of IP addresses. We found only a small
number of domains (1%) that included the real IP address
of their web server in one of their pages, making it one of
the least e↵ective origin-exposing vectors.
Outbound connections
Since triggering outbound connections is closely tied to the
applications that run on any given web server, it is near
impossible to get a comprehensive measurement of the as-
sociated risk. In order to get an impression of what is
possible, we chose to conduct two experiments on poten-
tially widespread mechanisms. The first one revolved around
the Pingback mechanism, which is mostly found on Word-
Press [54], the most wide-spread blogging software [40]. The
second experiment focussed on the verification of the HTTP
referrer header, which is being used, e.g., by RefBack [47],
to discover incoming links.
Pingback exposure. Pingback is a protocol that allows
website owners to get notified when one of their pages or
articles is mentioned on another website. When a server re-
ceives a notification, Pingback should automatically visit the
other website to verify whether it actually contains a valid
hyperlink. This verification procedure can be leveraged to
trigger an outbound connection from the origin. For the Ori-
gin in content vector, every domain in the evaluation set was
crawled. During this process, we simultaneously searched for
Pingback enabled webpages. Next, we made an XML-RPC
request to the Pingback endpoints, in which we included a
URL of a page on our server that contained a unique token
for each domain. As a result, we could extract candidate
origin IP addresses by monitoring the incoming requests on
our server and recording which IP addresses accessed which
domain-specific, tokenized URLs.
Essentially, Pingbacks allow a third party to force a web
server to issue a request to an arbitrary host. In the past,
this had lead to the creation of entire WordPress botnets,
which were abused to conduct DDoS attacks on websites [5].
As a consequence, awareness about Pingback abuse was in-
creased, encouraging many security companies and admin-
istrators to take steps towards preventing it from happen-
ing again [32, 46]. During our analysis, we often found that
websites and CBSPs were actively blocking our Pingback re-
quests, or refrained from initiating any outbound connection
to our server. However, we were still able to confirm that
6.9% of protected domains expose their origin’s IP address
through the Pingback mechanism.
Referrer verification exposure. In order to test expo-
sure through referrer verification, we set the HTTP Refer-
rer header to a tokenized URL during the entire domain
crawling process. Similar to our Pingback approach, we
monitored whether there were any connections made to our
unique URLs, potentially by a web application of the origin
that wanted to inspect the referrer page that had lead a user
to the origin’s website. Our results indicate that this vector
poses only a minor risk for origin exposure. Only 0.5% of
domains were exposed by making an outbound connection
from their origin to the referrer of a visitor on their website.
Our server was, however, contacted by a plethora of other
IP addresses which mostly belonged to web spiders, such as,
Googlebot [16] and Proximic [39].
5. DISCUSSION & COUNTERMEASURES
Our findings categorically demonstrate that a comprehen-
sive adoption of CBSPs is harder than just changing DNS
records. Multiple origin-exposing vectors are highly preva-
lent and they generally involve di↵erent underlying causes,
making the problem complex and multifaceted. Addition-
ally, the results of our large-scale analysis are lower bounds.
In the wild, an attacker can go to a greater extent to discover
the origin of a particular targeted victim. For instance, if an
attacker has found an IP address associated with a website
through one of the origin-exposing vectors, he could scan the
entire IP address block to which it belongs in further search
for the origin. This can be e↵ective when a victim has re-
quested a new, “clean” IP address, but that address is pos-
sibly close to the previous one, since it is distributed by the
same ISP. Similarly, when associated servers, such as mail
servers, are discovered through subdomains or DNS records,
it is a reasonable assumption that the origin is located at a
nearby address. Furthermore, attackers can manually ana-
lyze the website to trigger outbound connections, search for
specific configuration files, test for more subdomains, and
perform much more intrusive tests than those included in
Cloudpiercer.
Ultimately, unlike us, an attacker is not necessarily bound
to origin verification. As noted in [34], an attacker can de-
duce the location of the origin by starting a DDoS attack
on one or more plausible IP addresses and observing the ef-
fect it has on the CBSP-protected website. If the origin is
taken down by this attack, the CBSP will display either a
static cached copy of the o✏ine website, or a 404-like error
message.
Countermeasures
Complete mitigation of origin exposure is hard, as adminis-
trators are required to fully understand the potential risks
and comprehensively address all vulnerabilities in order to
fully prevent an attacker from circumventing the CBSP.
However, a tool similar to Cloudpiercer could be deployed
by CBSPs to proactively scan their client’s domains for ex-
posed origins, creating awareness and helping administrators
fix specific vulnerabilities.
Apart from countering each origin-exposing vector, the
logical first line of defense is a proper firewall configuration
that blocks all connections except those originating from
the CBSP. This will significantly complicate the life of an
attacker who will not be able to tell whether an IP address
is unreachable, or whether it, in fact, is the origin of a tar-
get website. Together with requesting a new IP address,
this firewall configuration should be standard practice when
cloud-based security is utilized. We can safely assume that
the vast majority of customers are currently not adopting
such a strategy, since, if they did, our origin verification
method would have failed. It appears that administrators
are either uninformed about the risks, or are deterred by
the complications of properly whitelisting all IP addresses
necessary to keep the website operational. We conducted
a small-scale survey asking vulnerable websites about the
missing firewall configurations and their CBSP-related se-
curity expectations but we, unfortunately, received no re-
sponses.
CBSPs could actively monitor whether their client’s do-
main was assigned a fresh IP address, and whether the client’s
web server is blocking requests coming from outside of the
CBSP’s network. This information could then further be
used to explicitly warn and motivate administrators to take
the necessary measures to prevent exposure.
Another beneficial strategy for CBSPs is to assign a unique
IP address to each customer, which is already the case with
Prolexic and DOSarrest. As our results showed, this has
a significant e↵ect on the number of subdomains and DNS
records exposures. If the necessary ports can be forwarded
to the origin, there is no need to set up subdomains or MX
records that connect directly to the origin’s IP address. We
expect that as the adoption of IPv6 expands, this defense
mechanism will become increasingly more practical, even for
very large CBSPs, such as CloudFlare.
Possibly, some larger websites that possess entire /24 IP
blocks might be able to initiate BGP rerouting once the
origin has been attacked directly. However, relying on this
fallback scenario defeats the benefits of the always-on strat-
egy and eliminates the protection against web application
attacks.
6. RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to
review existing origin-exposing attack vectors for the bypass-
ing of CBSPs, propose new ones, and systematically assess
the magnitude of the exposure problem in the wild.
Over the years, a plethora of DDoS defense systems have
been proposed. However, destination-based systems are usu-
ally rendered ine↵ective against large volumetric attacks that
are able to saturate a site’s uplink. Additionally, according
to Huang et al. [19], systems that seek cooperation of many
di↵erent parties usually face deployment issues. The authors
argue that a lack of incentive prevents these cooperative sys-
tems from being widely deployed across the Internet’s infras-
tructure. For instance, the profit of transit providers greatly
depends on the amount of tra c they forward. Hence, these
providers are cautious with implementing filtering systems
that might negatively impact their business. In constrast,
recent publications [11, 24] have documented the decline of
the NTP DDoS attacks, impacted by a large-scale collabo-
rative e↵ort amongst ISPs, CERTs and academia.
A feasible non-collaborative solution for a victimized au-
tonomous system (AS) was introduced in 2003 by Argawal
et al. [2]. The concept is to reroute DDoS tra c through
o↵-site cleaning centers that are dedicated to filtering and
absorbing malicious attack tra c. The authors studied var-
ious network-layer techniques for diverting DDoS tra c to
cleaning centers and, afterwards, redirecting the clean traf-
fic to the protected web server. This work later became the
inspiration for the patents of several popular DDoS miti-
gation services, such as Prolexic [29]. The use of rerout-
ing techniques, such as BGP diversion and GRE tunnelling,
resurfaced in Shield by Kline et al. [22]. In that paper, the
authors focus on leveraging the o↵-site DDoS mitigation as
an insurance model to solve the incentive problem. The au-
thors also note that CDNs can be leveraged as DDoS defense
systems in a similar fashion. In 2007, Lee et al. [26] already
studied the inherent DDoS resilience of CDNs and proposed
a novel scheme to further improve their robustness against
attacks.
As CDNs further incorporated security features into their
products, their business extended increasingly into cloud-
based security providers. Thereupon, various studies evalu-
ated these security components and several problems were
uncovered. For instance, Liang et al. [28] analyzed how
HTTPS was implemented within the context of CDNs. In-
herently, a CDN is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between
the website and its visitors. This allows them to inspect
incoming requests for the purpose of serving cached content
and filtering out malicious requests. However, as HTTPS is
intended for end-to-end encryption, this introduces various
complications. In their study, the authors report on sev-
eral implementation issues, including private key sharing,
insecure back-end communication and numerous issues with
invalid, stale and revoked certificates.
Another issue, discovered by Triukose et al. [50], allows
CDNs to be abused to conduct a bandwidth amplification
DDoS attack against their own customers. The vulnerabil-
ity leveraged the fact that requests to CDN-enabled websites
typically involve two decoupled TCP connections, with the
CDN as a MITM. However, once the CDN forwards an at-
tacker’s request to the origin, the attacker can cleverly break
o↵ his own TCP connection with the CDN. Thereupon, the
origin will waste bandwidth by sending a response to the
CDN that will no longer be forwarded to the attacker.
Finally, in 2013, Nixon et al. [34] and McDonald [31] raised
awareness of origin-exposing vectors that could enable at-
tackers to bypass CBSPs and CDNs. We extend their work
by proposing novel origin-exposing vectors and combining
them into one automated origin-exposing tool with origin-
verification capabilities, which we then deployed to conduct
the first large-scale assessment of the issue. DOM-based
similarities, which we leveraged for origin-verification, were
previously used by [44] to detect phising attempts.
7. CONCLUSION
Cloud-based security is a popular solution to counter the
increasing threat of DDoS and web application attacks. CB-
SPs that use proxying via DNS are adopted by at least 9%
of the 10K most popular websites. Presumably, the trivial
setup without infrastructural investments, combined with
the benefit of an always-on protection service, attracts a
large user base. The mechanism itself, however, su↵ers from
a critical weakness. The entire mitigation service is com-
pletely dependent on the secrecy of the website’s hosting
IP address, the so-called origin. Moreover, several vulnera-
bilities are reported that have the potential to expose this
origin.
In this paper, we discussed eight origin-exposing vectors,
including various novel vulnerabilities. We consolidated all
vectors into Cloudpiercer, an automated origin-exposing
tool, which we then used to conduct the first large-scale
analysis to measure the global risk of origin exposure. Our
results demonstrate that the problem is severe: 71.5% of
the 17,877 CBSP-protected websites that we tested, exposed
their real IP address through at least one of the evaluated
vectors.
Taking into account the severe consequences of an exposed
origin and its prevalence amongst CBSP-protected websites,
we opine that the problem is currently inadequately ad-
dressed. However, the findings of our research can be used
both by CBSPs to encourage better practices regarding the
adoption of their security infrastructure, as well as by ad-
ministrators of CBSP-protected websites who can verify and
remediate their own origin-exposing vulnerabilities. All five
CBSPs have been notified of our findings prior to publica-
tion.
Finally, a silver lining of our findings is that a tool like
Cloudpiercer can, in principle, be used by law enforce-
ment. It is well known that miscreants use CBSPs to hide
their real hosting location [6], making it harder to track and
shut them down. Consequently, the discussed vectors and
their reported e↵ectiveness can be leveraged by the appro-
priate institutions to react quicker against malicious online
activities.
8. AVAILABILITY
Cloudpiercer will be made available as a web service
on https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/cloudpiercer/,
where users of CBSPs, after proving ownership of their web-
sites, will be able to submit their URLs for scanning and
get a detailed report on all the origin-exposing vectors that
Cloudpiercer was able to find. We hope that the commu-
nity will benefit from this service by allowing administrators
to discover and eliminate vulnerabilities on their websites,
before they are discovered and abused by attackers.
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